Article 13 of the Constitution declares that all "laws in force" inconsistent with fundamental rights are void. Does that command reach Hindu personal law? The answer depends on a distinction that has shaped — and troubled — Indian constitutional law since 1952: between personal law as codified in statutes, which is unquestionably subject to fundamental rights, and personal law in its uncodified, customary form, whose status remains genuinely contested. This article maps the question carefully: the constitutional text, the Bombay High Court's decision in State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, the criticism it has attracted, the Supreme Court's later ambivalence, and the honest position today — which is that the broader question has never been finally settled by the Supreme Court.
A question the Constitution left ambiguous
The framers of the Constitution wrote Article 13 to purge the pre-constitutional legal order of laws inconsistent with fundamental rights. But they did not expressly say whether personal law — the body of rules governing marriage, succession, adoption, guardianship and family life for each religious community — counted among the "laws in force" to be purged. They legislated for personal law reform elsewhere: Article 44 directs the State to endeavour to secure a uniform civil code, a directive principle that presupposes reform through legislation rather than through judicial invalidation.
That silence has done seventy years of work. It allowed the Bombay High Court in 1952 to hold that uncodified personal laws stand outside Article 13, and it has left the Supreme Court circling the question ever since — never squarely deciding it, occasionally doubting the 1952 answer, and leaving the field to a debate that is still unresolved.
The text of Article 13
Article 13(1) provides that all laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of Part III, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void. Article 13(3)(a) defines "law" to include "any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law".
Two features of this text drive the entire debate. First, the definition expressly includes "custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law" — and a great deal of personal law, particularly in its uncodified form, is precisely custom and usage. Second, the definition is framed around instruments that appear to emanate from public authority — ordinances, orders, rules, regulations, notifications — which lends support to the view that the framers were thinking of State-made law. The question is which of the two features controls.
Codified Hindu law is unquestionably "law"
The first part of the map is settled. The great codifying statutes of the mid-1950s — the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, and the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 — are ordinary Acts of Parliament. They are "law" within Article 13(3)(a) in the plainest sense, and they are fully subject to the fundamental rights in Part III.
The courts have acted on this more than once. In John Vallamattom v. Union of India, (2003) 6 SCC 611, the Supreme Court struck down Section 118 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 — a provision of codified Christian personal law restricting bequests for charitable purposes — as violating Article 14. Provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act and allied statutes have likewise been read down or examined against constitutional standards. Whatever immunity personal law may or may not enjoy, it does not extend to personal law as enacted in a statute.
The uncodified residue
Codification, however, was never complete. Around the edges of the statutes — and in matters the statutes left alone — Hindu law continues to operate through its uncodified sources: the dharmashastra commentaries as historically applied by the courts, local and family customs, and usages having force in a particular community or region. Agricultural land succession, for instance, was left by the Hindu Succession Act to state-level regulation and custom in several states, and questions of custom still arise in succession, adoption and family arrangements.
It is this uncodified residue that Article 13's reach is contested over. If uncodified personal law is "custom or usage having the force of law", it would seem to fall within Article 13(3)(a) and be open to challenge for inconsistency with Articles 14, 15 and 21. If it is not — if personal law is a source of obligation distinct from "law" as the Constitution uses that word — it stands outside fundamental rights review altogether.
State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali (Bombay High Court, 1952)
The locus classicus is State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, decided in 1952 by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court comprising Chief Justice Chagla and Justice Gajendragadkar. The case arose from a challenge to the Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous Marriages Act, 1946, which prohibited bigamy among Hindus in Bombay State. The petitioners argued that the Act violated Articles 14 and 15 by applying to Hindus alone; the State's answer was that if uncodified Hindu personal law were subject to Article 13, the bigamous marriages that Hindu custom permitted would already have been void, and the 1946 Act would have been unnecessary.
The Full Bench upheld the Act and, in doing so, held that uncodified personal laws are not "laws in force" within the meaning of Article 13(1). Chief Justice Chagla reasoned that the words "law" and "laws in force" in Article 13 refer to laws made by a sovereign legislative authority or derived from instruments of the State, and that personal laws — which derive their authority from the religion and usage of a community rather than from the State — stand outside that category. The consequence is that uncodified personal law cannot be challenged as void for inconsistency with fundamental rights.
It must be emphasised: Narasu Appa Mali is a decision of a High Court — a persuasive and long-followed one, followed by courts across the country for decades — but not a decision of the Supreme Court, and not a binding pronouncement of the apex court on the point.
The reasoning and its critics
The criticism of Narasu has accumulated over the years, and it is serious criticism. Four strands recur:
- Article 13(3)(a) expressly includes "custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law" — and uncodified personal law is, in substantial part, custom and usage. Reading the definition to exclude it requires treating the express words as surplusage.
- Article 17 expressly "abolishes" untouchability, which had its roots in caste custom. If custom were wholly immune from fundamental rights review, the framers would have had no need to abolish it by a specific article — suggesting they expected customary practice to be constitutionally reachable.
- The distinction produces an asymmetry that penalises reform: a community whose personal law is codified exposes it to fundamental rights scrutiny, while a community that leaves its law uncodified enjoys immunity — an incentive structure that rewards non-reform.
- Commentators, notably H.M. Seervai in his Constitutional Law of India, have argued that the reasoning conflates the source of a rule's authority with its character as law, and that a rule having the force of law in India is "law in force" whatever its origin.
None of this criticism has yet produced a definitive judicial answer. But it explains why the question has refused to stay closed, and why judges have returned to it repeatedly in the last decade.
The Supreme Court's ambivalence
The Supreme Court has approached the question obliquely rather than head-on. In Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir, (1980) 3 SCC 523, the Court held that courts cannot introduce principles of modern personal law into uncodified Hindu personal law — the reform of uncodified personal law, the Court said, is a matter for the legislature. The decision assumed the Narasu position without deciding the Article 13 question itself.
In Ahmedabad Women Action Group v. Union of India (1997), organisations working on women's rights sought declarations that various provisions of personal laws — Hindu, Muslim and Christian — violated fundamental rights. The Court declined to entertain the challenge, observing that personal law reform was a matter for the legislature, and disposed of the petitions without deciding whether personal laws are justiciable against Part III. The result was that the constitutional question survived, untested.
Shayara Bano and Sabarimala: cracks in the edifice
Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1
In Shayara Bano, a five-judge Bench of the Supreme Court set aside the practice of talaq-e-biddat (instant triple talaq) in Muslim personal law. Justices Nariman and Lalit, forming part of the majority, held the practice to be manifestly arbitrary and therefore violative of Article 14 — applying the test of a fundamental right to a practice of personal law. The judges, however, differed in their reasoning on the deeper question of whether personal law is "law" within Article 13, and the majority did not settle that question. Shayara Bano therefore demonstrates that personal law practices can be reached by constitutional standards in appropriate cases, without finally answering the Article 13 question.
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (Sabarimala), (2019) 11 SCC 1
In the Sabarimala case, Justice Chandrachud's concurring opinion observed that Narasu Appa Mali was wrongly decided and that personal laws cannot be excluded from fundamental rights review. Justice Indu Malhotra's dissent, by contrast, relied on the Narasu line to hold that constitutional morality should not be used to invalidate religious practices. These observations, however, arose in a case about temple entry — the comments on Narasu were obiter dicta, expressions of view not necessary to the decision, and therefore not a binding holding. What Sabarimala shows is that the Narasu position no longer commands unquestioned acceptance on the Supreme Court; what it does not show is that the position has been overruled.
Modern Women v. Union of India (Delhi High Court, 2022) and the pending appeal
The most direct judicial engagement came in 2022, when a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Modern Women v. Union of India — a petition challenging aspects of Hindu personal law — held that Narasu Appa Mali was not good law, and that personal laws are subject to the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution.
That decision has been appealed, and the question it decided awaits authoritative resolution by the Supreme Court. Until the Supreme Court rules, the Delhi High Court's view — however reasoned — is not the law of the land, and courts outside Delhi are not bound by it. The honest position is that the constitutional status of uncodified personal law under Article 13 is contested and sub judice.
Settled and unsettled: an honest map
It is worth stating precisely what is settled and what is not, because this area invites overstatement in both directions.
- Settled: codified personal law statutes — the Hindu Marriage Act, the Hindu Succession Act and their counterparts for other communities — are "law" under Article 13 and fully subject to fundamental rights review.
- Settled: courts will not judicially reform uncodified personal law; its modernisation is a legislative task (Krishna Singh; Ahmedabad Women Action Group).
- Settled: Narasu Appa Mali has been followed for decades and continues to influence outcomes, and no Supreme Court decision has overruled it.
- Contested: whether uncodified personal law is "law in force" within Article 13(1) and therefore open to challenge under Articles 14, 15 and 21. This has never been decided by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court.
- Contested and pending: the appeal against the Delhi High Court's 2022 decision in Modern Women, which held Narasu not good law, awaits the Supreme Court's verdict.
Any article, argument or advice that asserts either blanket immunity or blanket reviewability of uncodified personal law is going further than the authorities allow. The question is open, and it matters — for gender justice within personal law, for the uniform civil code debate under Article 44, and for how reform of family law will happen in India: by legislation, by constitutional adjudication, or by both. Book a confidential consultation with Advocate Shailender Singh in Lucknow.
General legal information, not legal advice
This article provides general legal information about a contested question of constitutional law. It is not legal advice, and it deliberately does not assert a settled position where the law is unsettled. If you are involved in a matter that turns on the constitutional status of a personal law rule — codified or uncodified — the position must be assessed on current authority by a qualified advocate, and the state of the pending appeal must be checked, because this is an area in which the law may move.
If you need assistance with a constitutional or family law matter in Lucknow, consult an advocate experienced in both fields. Book a confidential consultation with Advocate Shailender Singh in Lucknow.
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