The Constitutional Immunity of Personal Laws From Fundamental Rights Review
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Constitutional Law

The Constitutional Immunity of Personal Laws From Fundamental Rights Review

13 min readReviewed 2024By Advocate Shailender Singh, Lucknow

It is often said, loosely, that personal laws in India enjoy "constitutional immunity" from fundamental rights review. The position is more nuanced, and the shorthand can mislead. Codified personal law — the statutes governing marriage, succession and adoption for each community — is unquestionably subject to the fundamental rights in Part III. The claimed immunity attaches only to personal law in its uncodified, customary form, rests on a 1952 High Court decision that the Supreme Court has never affirmed, and is today openly contested and pending adjudication. This article sets out the doctrine of immunity as it is actually understood, distinguishes it from the settled reviewability of codified law, and explains why no advocate can assert blanket immunity as settled law.

What "immunity" actually means

The phrase "constitutional immunity of personal laws" refers, at its strongest, to the claim that personal law is not "law" within Article 13 of the Constitution, and therefore cannot be challenged as void for inconsistency with the fundamental rights in Part III — Articles 14 (equality), 15 (non-discrimination), 21 (life and liberty) and the rest. If that claim were sound, a rule of personal law that discriminated between men and women, or between communities, could not be struck down by a court on constitutional grounds; its reform would lie entirely with the legislature.

Two qualifications narrow the claim immediately. First, the immunity is asserted only for uncodified personal law — custom and usage — not for personal law as enacted in statutes. Second, the claim rests on a High Court decision, not a Supreme Court ruling, and the Supreme Court has never finally accepted it. The immunity, if it exists at all, is partial, contested and sub judice.

Codified personal law is not immune

The codifying statutes — the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, the Indian Succession Act, 1925, the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, and others — are Acts of the legislature. They are "law" within Article 13(3)(a) in the ordinary sense, and they are fully open to fundamental rights challenge. In John Vallamattom v. Union of India, (2003) 6 SCC 611, the Supreme Court struck down Section 118 of the Indian Succession Act as violative of Article 14, demonstrating that codified personal law enjoys no immunity whatever.

This point is decisive against any blanket statement of immunity. When a personal law rule has been enacted in a statute, it is reviewable like any other law. The immunity debate concerns only the residue of personal law that operates outside statute — through custom, usage, and traditional sources as applied by the courts.

The source of the immunity claim: Narasu Appa Mali (1952)

The immunity claim traces to State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali (1952), a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court. Upholding a state law against bigamy among Hindus, the Court held that uncodified personal laws are not "laws in force" within Article 13(1), because they derive their authority from the religion and usage of a community rather than from the State, and therefore cannot be challenged for inconsistency with fundamental rights.

Narasu Appa Mali was followed by High Courts across India for decades and exerted a powerful practical influence: it meant that uncodified personal law rules, however unequal, could not be reached by constitutional challenge, and that their reform was left to the legislature under the directive principle in Article 44 (uniform civil code). But it remained a High Court authority. The Supreme Court never sat as a Constitution Bench to decide whether uncodified personal law is "law" under Article 13, and so the question was never authoritatively settled.

The criticism of the immunity doctrine

The immunity doctrine has attracted sustained criticism, on grounds examined in detail in our companion article on Hindu personal laws and Article 13. In summary, the critics argue that Article 13(3)(a) expressly includes "custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law", which uncodified personal law substantially is; that Article 17's express abolition of untouchability presupposes that custom is constitutionally reachable; and that the doctrine creates an asymmetry rewarding communities that leave their law uncodified with immunity, while penalising those that reform by exposing the reformed law to scrutiny.

Scholars including H.M. Seervai argued that the Narasu reasoning conflated the source of a rule's authority with its character as law. The criticism has not overturned the doctrine, but it has kept the question alive and has emboldened later courts to revisit it.

Shayara Bano (2017): reaching a personal law practice

In Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1, the Supreme Court set aside the practice of talaq-e-biddat — instant triple talaq — in Muslim personal law. Justices Nariman and Lalit, in the majority, held the practice to be manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14. The decision showed that a personal law practice can be reached by constitutional standards in an appropriate case.

What Shayara Bano did not do is settle the Article 13 question. The judges differed on whether personal law is "law" within Article 13, and the majority did not resolve that deeper issue. The case therefore weakened the practical force of the immunity claim without formally overruling Narasu Appa Mali.

The pending reference: the question is open

In 2022, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Modern Women v. Union of India held that Narasu Appa Mali was not good law, and that personal laws are subject to fundamental rights review. That decision has been appealed, and the question — whether uncodified personal law is "law in force" under Article 13 — now awaits authoritative resolution by the Supreme Court.

Until the Supreme Court rules, the immunity doctrine cannot be stated as settled law. It is a position that has long been followed, that continues to influence outcomes, and that the Supreme Court has not overturned — but it is also a position that the Supreme Court has never affirmed, that distinguished judges have doubted, and that is presently under challenge. The honest description is that the constitutional status of uncodified personal law is contested and sub judice.

Reform: legislation, adjudication, or both

The immunity debate is inseparable from the question of how personal law reform should occur in India. Article 44 directs the State to endeavour to secure a uniform civil code, presupposing legislative reform. The Supreme Court has, in several decisions, urged the legislature to take up the task. At the same time, cases like Shayara Bano show that judicial review can reach personal law practices even without a final ruling on the Article 13 question.

The likely future is a combination: incremental legislative reform of specific personal law provisions, alongside cautious judicial review of practices that offend fundamental rights — with the deeper constitutional question resolved, if at all, only when the Supreme Court finally decides the pending reference.

What this means in practice

  • Do not assume a personal law rule is immune from challenge merely because it is "personal law" — codified provisions are fully reviewable.
  • Do not assume uncodified personal law is reviewable either — the question is contested and pending, and a challenge to uncodified custom faces real doctrinal obstacles.
  • The forum and the framing matter: a challenge to a statutory provision proceeds under ordinary Article 14/15 grounds; a challenge to uncodified custom must reckon with Narasu and its uncertain present status.
  • Reform of personal law is, for now, primarily a legislative task under Article 44, supplemented by targeted judicial review of specific practices.

Any advice that asserts blanket immunity, or blanket reviewability, of personal law is going further than the authorities permit. The position is partial, contested, and awaiting final word from the Supreme Court. Book a confidential consultation with Advocate Shailender Singh in Lucknow.

General legal information, not legal advice

This article offers general legal information about a contested area of constitutional law. It is not legal advice, and it deliberately avoids asserting a settled position where the law is unsettled. If you are involved in a matter turning on the constitutional status of a personal law rule, the position must be assessed on current authority by a qualified advocate, and the status of the pending Supreme Court reference must be verified, because this is an area in which the law may move.

If you need assistance with a constitutional or family law matter in Lucknow, consult an advocate experienced in both fields. Book a confidential consultation with Advocate Shailender Singh in Lucknow.

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